# Orca

> Not investment advice. Ratings describe on-chain configuration only and may contain errors.

Snapshot 2026-10-24, methodology v0.2. Source: Celebtir, CC BY 4.0.

## Summary

- Chain: Solana
- Category: dex
- Stage: Stage 0
- TVL: $300.11M
- Website: https://www.orca.so/
- Core programs controlled by a Squads multisig

## Value

Asset groups unavailable: DefiLlama has no per-token breakdown for this protocol.
- SOL (lp): worst rating Low. no freeze, pause or seize power; native to Solana; mint authority renounced: supply is fixed; no transfer restrictions
- USDC (lp): worst rating High. balances can be frozen by single key 7dGb…Crar; new supply can be minted by single key BJE5…5ruG

## Activity

- 24h volume: $183.81M (−11.7% over 7 days)
- 24h fees: $198.98K (−6.8% over 7 days)

## Risk summary

- Medium: Core program code can be replaced by 5 of 9 voters of multisig BQsDWkL417U4tVE2sDnPks469pKdm6YzFgKH77doiEjF.
- Medium: An approved upgrade takes effect after 24 h. Withdrawal completion within that period is not established by these configuration facts.
- Medium: The deployed code of whirLbMiicVdio4qvUfM5KAg6Ct8VwpYzGff3uctyCc has not been verified against its public source.

## Risk analysis

- Upgrade control: **Medium**. Squads v4 multisig, 5 of 9 voters, time lock 24 h. To improve: a multisig of 5+ voters at a 60%+ threshold → LOW, or make the program immutable.
  - Evidence: [CtXfPzz36dH5Ws4UYKZvrQ1Xqzn42ecDW6y8NKuiN8nD](https://solscan.io/account/CtXfPzz36dH5Ws4UYKZvrQ1Xqzn42ecDW6y8NKuiN8nD) `upgrade_authority` at slot 460978024
  - Evidence: [BQsDWkL417U4tVE2sDnPks469pKdm6YzFgKH77doiEjF](https://solscan.io/account/BQsDWkL417U4tVE2sDnPks469pKdm6YzFgKH77doiEjF) `threshold, time_lock, members, config_authority` at slot 460978025
- Upgrade delay: **Medium**. time lock 24 h. To improve: a time lock of 5 days+ → LOW.
  - Evidence: [CtXfPzz36dH5Ws4UYKZvrQ1Xqzn42ecDW6y8NKuiN8nD](https://solscan.io/account/CtXfPzz36dH5Ws4UYKZvrQ1Xqzn42ecDW6y8NKuiN8nD) `upgrade_authority` at slot 460978024
  - Evidence: [BQsDWkL417U4tVE2sDnPks469pKdm6YzFgKH77doiEjF](https://solscan.io/account/BQsDWkL417U4tVE2sDnPks469pKdm6YzFgKH77doiEjF) `threshold, time_lock, members, config_authority` at slot 460978025
- Admin powers: **Low**. `fee_authority` can change parameters behind a 24 h time lock. To improve: none: LOW is the lowest risk level.
  - Evidence: [2LecshUwdy9xi7meFgHtFJQNSKk4KdTrcpvaB56dP2NQ](https://solscan.io/account/2LecshUwdy9xi7meFgHtFJQNSKk4KdTrcpvaB56dP2NQ) `fee_authority` at slot 460978303
  - Evidence: [BQsDWkL417U4tVE2sDnPks469pKdm6YzFgKH77doiEjF](https://solscan.io/account/BQsDWkL417U4tVE2sDnPks469pKdm6YzFgKH77doiEjF) `threshold, time_lock, members, config_authority` at slot 460978025
- Code transparency: **Medium**. source public at https://github.com/orca-so/whirlpools, but the deployed build is not verified. To improve: verify the deployed build against public source (OtterSec) → LOW.
  - Evidence: [whirLbMiicVdio4qvUfM5KAg6Ct8VwpYzGff3uctyCc](https://solscan.io/account/whirLbMiicVdio4qvUfM5KAg6Ct8VwpYzGff3uctyCc) `verified_build` at slot 460978023
- Oracle dependency: **Not applicable**. the registry lists no price feeds; the evidence is the core programs' upgrade reads. To improve: not applicable: nothing to improve.
  - Evidence: [CtXfPzz36dH5Ws4UYKZvrQ1Xqzn42ecDW6y8NKuiN8nD](https://solscan.io/account/CtXfPzz36dH5Ws4UYKZvrQ1Xqzn42ecDW6y8NKuiN8nD) `upgrade_authority` at slot 460978024
  - Evidence: [BQsDWkL417U4tVE2sDnPks469pKdm6YzFgKH77doiEjF](https://solscan.io/account/BQsDWkL417U4tVE2sDnPks469pKdm6YzFgKH77doiEjF) `threshold, time_lock, members, config_authority` at slot 460978025
- Dependencies: **Low**. calls no other programs with user funds. To improve: none: LOW is the lowest risk level.
  - Evidence: [whirLbMiicVdio4qvUfM5KAg6Ct8VwpYzGff3uctyCc](https://solscan.io/account/whirLbMiicVdio4qvUfM5KAg6Ct8VwpYzGff3uctyCc) `transaction sample (45 transactions)` at slot 460978303

## Stage

Stage 0. Stages describe who can change the protocol and how fast. They don't measure code security.

- [x] Stage 0: core programs identified in the registry (1 core programs)
- [x] Stage 0: public source for every core program (all core programs have public source)
- [x] Stage 0: upgrade control readable for every core program (upgrade control read for all core programs)
- [x] Stage 1: upgrade control rated Low or Medium (MEDIUM: Squads v4 multisig, 5 of 9 voters, time lock 24 h)
- [ ] Stage 1: upgrade delay of the Stage 1 minimum, unless upgrades need an emergency multisig (whirLbMiicVdio4qvUfM5KAg6Ct8VwpYzGff3uctyCc: effective time lock 24 h; needs 5 days+ or an emergency multisig of 8+ voters at 75%+)
- [x] Stage 1: admin powers rated Low or Medium (LOW: `fee_authority` can change parameters behind a 24 h time lock)
- [x] Stage 1: no multisig has a single-key config authority (no single-key config authority)
- [ ] Stage 1: verified builds for all core programs (not verified: whirLbMiicVdio4qvUfM5KAg6Ct8VwpYzGff3uctyCc)
- [x] Stage 1: every factor could be read (Unknown caps the Stage at 0) (no Unknown factors)
- [ ] Stage 2: core programs immutable, or upgradeable only through on-chain governance with a long delay (upgradeable without 30 days+ governance delay: whirLbMiicVdio4qvUfM5KAg6Ct8VwpYzGff3uctyCc)
- [x] Stage 2: no key can move or freeze user funds (no admin key can move or freeze funds)

## Control graph

- Whirlpools → Orca: core program
- fee_authority → Orca: admin account
- USDC → Orca: used as liquidity
- SOL → Orca: used as liquidity
- Single key → USDC: can freeze · no delay
- Single key → USDC: can mint · no delay
- Squads 5 of 9 · 24 h delay → Whirlpools: can upgrade · 24 h delay
- Squads 5 of 9 · 24 h delay → fee_authority: can change parameters · 24 h delay

## Permissions

- Single key [7dGbd2QZcCKcTndnHcTL8q7SMVXAkp688NTQYwrRCrar](https://solscan.io/account/7dGbd2QZcCKcTndnHcTL8q7SMVXAkp688NTQYwrRCrar)
  - Freeze tokens: USDC (Circle), no delay
- Single key [BJE5MMbqXjVwjAF7oxwPYXnTXDyspzZyt4vwenNw5ruG](https://solscan.io/account/BJE5MMbqXjVwjAF7oxwPYXnTXDyspzZyt4vwenNw5ruG)
  - Mint tokens: USDC (Circle), no delay
- Squads 5 of 9 · 24 h delay [BQsDWkL417U4tVE2sDnPks469pKdm6YzFgKH77doiEjF](https://solscan.io/account/BQsDWkL417U4tVE2sDnPks469pKdm6YzFgKH77doiEjF)
  - Upgrade the code: Whirlpools, 24 h delay
  - Change parameters: fee_authority on 2Lec…P2NQ, 24 h delay
- Held by no one: Freeze tokens (SOL (Solana (native mint)))
- Held by no one: Mint tokens (SOL (Solana (native mint)))

## Programs

- Whirlpools [whirLbMiicVdio4qvUfM5KAg6Ct8VwpYzGff3uctyCc](https://solscan.io/account/whirLbMiicVdio4qvUfM5KAg6Ct8VwpYzGff3uctyCc): core, Upgradeable loader, controller Squads 5 of 9 · 24 h delay, public source at https://github.com/orca-so/whirlpools, not verified, last upgrade none found

## Upgrades & governance

- Upgrades: 0 so far (history still filling)
- Last upgrade: none
- Average interval: not enough upgrades

## Updates

No changes have been recorded for this protocol since tracking began.

## Dependencies and sources

The sampled transactions called no other programs with user funds.
- Registry source for admin fee_authority (2LecshUwdy9xi7meFgHtFJQNSKk4KdTrcpvaB56dP2NQ): https://solscan.io/account/2LecshUwdy9xi7meFgHtFJQNSKk4KdTrcpvaB56dP2NQ
- Registry source for multisig Squads v4 (BQsDWkL417U4tVE2sDnPks469pKdm6YzFgKH77doiEjF): https://solscan.io/account/BQsDWkL417U4tVE2sDnPks469pKdm6YzFgKH77doiEjF
- Registry source for program Whirlpools (whirLbMiicVdio4qvUfM5KAg6Ct8VwpYzGff3uctyCc): https://github.com/orca-so/whirlpools
- Registry entry last reviewed: 2026-10-19 by celebtir-loop-draft

Web page: /protocols/orca/