Who can upgrade SPL Stake Pool
Squads 6 of 10 · no delay
- Type
- Squads 6 of 10
- Threshold
- 6 of 10 signers
- Signers
- 10 listed
- Time lock
- None
- Config authority
- None: changes go through the multisig
- Effective delay
- no delay
- Address
- 3yqo…JcbW
Solana · Liquid staking
Jito
- TVL
- $1.05B
- Context only: never changes a rating
- 24h fees
- $145.75K
- +13.9% vs 7 days earlier
- Upgrade controller
- Squads 6 of 10 · no delay
- Weakest control over the core programs
- Stage
- Stage 0
- 2 requirements missing for Stage 1
- Last on-chain change
- None recorded
- Snapshot 2026-10-24 · read at Solana slot 460,976,990
Six risk factors independent ratings, never combined into one score
- Upgrade controlLowSquads v3 multisig, 6 of 10 voters, time lock 0 s
- Upgrade delayHightime lock 0 s
- Admin powersLowthe registry lists no admin accounts; the evidence is the core programs' upgrade reads
- Code transparencyMediumsource public at https://github.com/jito-foundation, but the deployed build is not verified
- Oracle dependencyNot applicablethe registry lists no price feeds; the evidence is the core programs' upgrade reads
- DependenciesLowall 1 callees rated Low on upgrade control
Summary
- Solana
- Liquid staking
- Squads-controlled
Jito is a liquid staking protocol on Solana. This page shows who can change it, how fast, and the on-chain account behind every rating.
Embed the Stage badge
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<a href="https://celebtir.com/protocols/jito/"><img src="https://celebtir.com/badges/jito.svg" alt="Jito on Celebtir: Stage 0"></a>Markdown
[](https://celebtir.com/protocols/jito/)Value
Show as table
| Date | TVL |
|---|---|
| 2026-10-21 | $1.12B |
| 2026-10-24 | $1.05B |
Asset groups
Asset groups unavailable: asset groups exceed the TVL.
Tokens used
| Token | Used as | Worst rating |
|---|---|---|
| JitoSOL | deposit | Highnew supply can be minted by unrecognized controller 6iQK…pVSS owned by program 1111…1111 |
Activity
Volume unavailable: no volume metric for this category; fees only.
Show as table
| Date | Fees |
|---|---|
| 2026-09-24 | $204.91K |
| 2026-09-25 | $0 |
| 2026-09-26 | $217.34K |
| 2026-09-27 | $220.11K |
| 2026-09-28 | $212.68K |
| 2026-09-29 | $0 |
| 2026-09-30 | $210.42K |
| 2026-10-01 | $212.72K |
| 2026-10-02 | $213.21K |
| 2026-10-03 | $0 |
| 2026-10-04 | $216.47K |
| 2026-10-05 | $216.34K |
| 2026-10-06 | $208.04K |
| 2026-10-07 | $0 |
| 2026-10-08 | $191.76K |
| 2026-10-09 | $195.93K |
| 2026-10-10 | $159.22K |
| 2026-10-11 | $161.59K |
| 2026-10-12 | $149.88K |
| 2026-10-13 | $155.45K |
| 2026-10-14 | $0 |
| 2026-10-15 | $140.35K |
| 2026-10-16 | $147.33K |
| 2026-10-17 | $148.86K |
| 2026-10-18 | $141.2K |
| 2026-10-19 | $142.85K |
| 2026-10-20 | $156.02K |
| 2026-10-21 | $155.85K |
| 2026-10-22 | $150.03K |
| 2026-10-23 | $145.75K |
Risk summary
- HighAn approved upgrade takes effect immediately. Withdrawal completion within that period is not established by these configuration facts.
- MediumThe deployed code of SPoo…kuHy has not been verified against its public source.
Risk analysis
Upgrade control
LowSquadsThe multisig program most Solana protocols use to hold upgrade and admin keys (version 4 is supported). v3 multisigAn account that acts only when enough of its members approve. On Solana this is usually a Squads multisig., 6 of 10 votersA multisig member with the Vote permission. Celebtir counts signers, not all members, when it compares a threshold., time lockA wait between approving a change and the change taking effect, which gives users time to leave. 0 s
To improve: none: LOW is the lowest risk level
Upgrade delay
Hightime lock 0 s
To improve: a time lock of 24 h+ → MEDIUM; 5 days+ → LOW
Admin powers
Lowthe registry lists no admin accounts; the evidence is the core programs' upgrade reads
To improve: none: LOW is the lowest risk level
Code transparency
Mediumsource public at jito-foundation, but the deployed build is not verified
To improve: verify the deployed build against public source (OtterSec) → LOW
Technical evidence (1 account)
- SPoo…kuHy verified_build Solana slot 460,976,700
Oracle dependency
Not applicablethe registry lists no price feeds; the evidence is the core programs' upgrade reads
To improve: not applicable: nothing to improve
Dependencies
Lowall 1 callees rated Low on upgrade control
To improve: none: LOW is the lowest risk level
Stage
Stage 0 · 2 missing for Stage 1
StagesA protocol's headline level, from Stage 0 (the team can change everything quickly) to Stage 2 (users are protected even from the team). Stages describe control, not code security. describe who can change the protocol and how fast. They don't measure code security.
- Stage 0 (current)
- Stage 1
- Stage 2
Stage 0 3 of 3 met
- Met: core programs identified in the registry
- Met: public source for every core program
- Met: upgrade control readable for every core program
Stage 1 4 of 6 met
- Met: upgrade control rated Low or Medium
Satisfied criterion and evidence
LOW: Squads v3 multisig, 6 of 10 voters, time lock 0 s
Published Stage criteria - Missing: upgrade delay of the Stage 1 minimum, unless upgrades need an emergency multisig
Unmet criterion
SPoo…kuHy: effective time lock 0 s; needs 5 days+ or an emergency multisig of 8+ voters at 75%+
Published Stage criteria - Met: admin powers rated Low or Medium
Satisfied criterion and evidence
LOW: the registry lists no admin accounts; the evidence is the core programs' upgrade reads
Published Stage criteria - Met: no multisig has a single-key config authorityA key that can change a Squads multisig's members, threshold and time lock without a vote. If it is set, it, not the multisig, is the real controller.
- Missing: verified buildsProof that the deployed program was built from a public commit, checked by OtterSec's verification service. for all core programs
- Met: every factor could be read (Unknown caps the Stage at 0)
Stage 2 1 of 2 met
- Missing: core programs immutableNo key can change it: the upgrade authority was removed, or the program was deployed with a loader that cannot upgrade., or upgradeable only through on-chain governance with a long delay
- Met: no key can move or freeze user funds
Satisfied criterion and evidence
no admin keyA key stored in a protocol's own accounts that can change parameters, pause the protocol or move funds, without upgrading its code. can move or freeze funds
Published Stage criteria
Control graph
Click a box for its facts and evidenceThe on-chain account, field and slot a fact was read from, with a link to check it on Solscan.. Arrows point from who holds a power to what it controls. Controllers shared across protocols
Loading the interactive graph…
List view
- Key Unrecognized 6iQK…pVSS High
- can mint · no delay → JitoSOL
- Multisig Squads 6 of 10 · no delay 3yqo…JcbW Low
- can upgrade · no delay → SPL Stake Pool
- Program SPL Stake Pool SPoo…kuHy Low
- core program → Jito
- ← Squads 6 of 10 · no delay can upgrade · no delay
- Token JitoSOL J1to…GCPn High
- used as deposit → Jito
- ← Unrecognized can mint · no delay
- Protocol Jito Stage 0.
- ← SPL Stake Pool core program
- ← JitoSOL used as deposit
Permissions
Unrecognized 6iQK…pVSS
Show in control graph| Power | Over | Delay | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mint tokens | JitoSOL (Jito) | no delay |
Squads 6 of 10 · no delay 3yqo…JcbW
Show in control graph| Power | Over | Delay | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Upgrade the code | SPL Stake Pool | no delay |
Held by no one
- Freeze tokens: JitoSOL (Jito) (renounced or immutable)
Programs
| Program | Role | Loader | Upgrade controller | Verification | Last upgrade |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SPL Stake Pool SPoo…kuHy | Core | Upgradeable loader | Squads 6 of 10 · no delay | Public source, not verified (source) | None found yet |
Upgrades & governance
- Upgrades
- 0
- Last upgrade
- None
- Average interval
- Not enough upgrades
- Last 30 days
- 0
History is still filling: 688 of 1,200 transactions examined so far.
No upgrades were found in the transactions examined so far.
Updates
No changes have been recorded for this protocol since tracking began.
Dependencies and sources
Called programs
- Stak…1111 Immutable Low
Registry sources
Registry entry last reviewed 2026-10-19 by celebtir-loop-draft. Report an error · Markdown version