Who can upgrade PumpSwap AMM
Squads 3 of 4 · no delay
- Type
- Squads 3 of 4
- Threshold
- 3 of 4 signers
- Signers
- 4 listed
- Time lock
- None
- Config authority
- None: changes go through the multisig
- Effective delay
- no delay
- Address
- 2yMo…rshW
Solana · Spot DEX
PumpSwap
- TVL
- $335.9M
- Context only: never changes a rating
- 24h volume
- $266.43M
- −20.6% vs 7 days earlier
- Upgrade controller
- Squads 3 of 4 · no delay
- Weakest control over the core programs
- Stage
- Stage 0
- 2 requirements missing for Stage 1
- Last on-chain change
- None recorded
- Snapshot 2026-10-24 · read at Solana slot 460,978,680
Six risk factors independent ratings, never combined into one score
- Upgrade controlMediumSquads v4 multisig, 3 of 4 voters, time lock 0 s
- Upgrade delayHightime lock 0 s
- Admin powersMedium`admin` can pause, held by Squads v4 multisig, 3 of 4 voters, time lock 0 s
- Code transparencyMediumsource public at https://github.com/pump-fun, but the deployed build is not verified
- Oracle dependencyNot applicablethe registry lists no price feeds; the evidence is the core programs' upgrade reads
- DependenciesMediumcallee 6EF8…wF6P is Squads v4 multisig, 3 of 4 voters, time lock 0 s; callee pfee…ojVZ is Squads v4 multisig, 3 of 4 voters, time lock 0 s
Summary
- Solana
- Spot DEX
- Squads-controlled
PumpSwap is a spot DEX on Solana. This page shows who can change it, how fast, and the on-chain account behind every rating.
Embed the Stage badge
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<a href="https://celebtir.com/protocols/pumpswap/"><img src="https://celebtir.com/badges/pumpswap.svg" alt="PumpSwap on Celebtir: Stage 0"></a>Markdown
[](https://celebtir.com/protocols/pumpswap/)Value
Show as table
| Date | TVL |
|---|---|
| 2026-10-21 | $356.65M |
| 2026-10-24 | $335.9M |
Asset groups
| Group | Value | Share |
|---|---|---|
| Stablecoins | $20.6M | 6.1% |
| SOL and staked SOL | $270.15M | 80.4% |
| BTC | $327.61K | 0.1% |
| Other | $44.83M | 13.3% |
Tokens used
| Token | Used as | Worst rating |
|---|---|---|
| SOL | lp | Lowno freeze, pause or seize power; native to Solana; mint authority renounced: supply is fixed; no transfer restrictions |
| USDC | lp | Highbalances can be frozen by single key 7dGb…Crar; new supply can be minted by single key BJE5…5ruG |
Activity
Show as table
| Date | Volume |
|---|---|
| 2026-09-24 | $133.76M |
| 2026-09-25 | $425.99M |
| 2026-09-26 | $513.61M |
| 2026-09-27 | $297.07M |
| 2026-09-28 | $268.39M |
| 2026-09-29 | $337.46M |
| 2026-09-30 | $207M |
| 2026-10-01 | $371.16M |
| 2026-10-02 | $321.13M |
| 2026-10-03 | $401.98M |
| 2026-10-04 | $397.81M |
| 2026-10-05 | $306.6M |
| 2026-10-06 | $302.95M |
| 2026-10-07 | $280.51M |
| 2026-10-08 | $364.57M |
| 2026-10-09 | $389.88M |
| 2026-10-10 | $235.28M |
| 2026-10-11 | $135.49M |
| 2026-10-12 | $411.88M |
| 2026-10-13 | $451.8M |
| 2026-10-14 | $252.51M |
| 2026-10-15 | $513.08M |
| 2026-10-16 | $545.45M |
| 2026-10-17 | $194.51M |
| 2026-10-18 | $467.32M |
| 2026-10-19 | $142.12M |
| 2026-10-20 | $396.96M |
| 2026-10-21 | $293.4M |
| 2026-10-22 | $259.02M |
| 2026-10-23 | $266.43M |
Show as table
| Date | Fees |
|---|---|
| 2026-09-24 | $3.39M |
| 2026-09-25 | $3.84M |
| 2026-09-26 | $5.59M |
| 2026-09-27 | $5.07M |
| 2026-09-28 | $5.5M |
| 2026-09-29 | $3.71M |
| 2026-09-30 | $3.89M |
| 2026-10-01 | $4.53M |
| 2026-10-02 | $4.74M |
| 2026-10-03 | $4.26M |
| 2026-10-04 | $5.16M |
| 2026-10-05 | $4.45M |
| 2026-10-06 | $4.47M |
| 2026-10-07 | $4.25M |
| 2026-10-08 | $3.64M |
| 2026-10-09 | $4.05M |
| 2026-10-10 | $3.61M |
| 2026-10-11 | $3.07M |
| 2026-10-12 | $3.61M |
| 2026-10-13 | $3.29M |
| 2026-10-14 | $3.29M |
| 2026-10-15 | $3.34M |
| 2026-10-16 | $3.28M |
| 2026-10-17 | $2.63M |
| 2026-10-18 | $2.91M |
| 2026-10-19 | $3.13M |
| 2026-10-20 | $3.29M |
| 2026-10-21 | $3.46M |
| 2026-10-22 | $3.45M |
| 2026-10-23 | $2.92M |
Risk summary
- HighAn approved upgrade takes effect immediately. Withdrawal completion within that period is not established by these configuration facts.
- MediumCore program code can be replaced by 3 of 4 votersA multisig member with the Vote permission. Celebtir counts signers, not all members, when it compares a threshold. of multisigAn account that acts only when enough of its members approve. On Solana this is usually a Squads multisig. 2yMo…rshW.
- MediumFunds can be frozen if the protocol is paused by 3 of 4 voters of multisig 8Euj…A5at using
admin. - MediumThe deployed code of pAMM…fXEA has not been verified against its public source.
- MediumProgram 6EF8…wF6P, which this protocol calls with user funds, can be upgraded by 3 of 4 voters of multisig 2yMo…rshW.
- MediumProgram pfee…ojVZ, which this protocol calls with user funds, can be upgraded by 3 of 4 voters of multisig 2yMo…rshW.
Risk analysis
Upgrade control
MediumSquadsThe multisig program most Solana protocols use to hold upgrade and admin keys (version 4 is supported). v4 multisig, 3 of 4 voters, time lockA wait between approving a change and the change taking effect, which gives users time to leave. 0 s
To improve: a multisig of 5+ voters at a 60%+ thresholdHow many signers of a multisig must approve before it can act. → LOW, or make the program immutableNo key can change it: the upgrade authority was removed, or the program was deployed with a loader that cannot upgrade.
Upgrade delay
Hightime lock 0 s
To improve: a time lock of 24 h+ → MEDIUM; 5 days+ → LOW
Admin powers
Mediumadmin can pause, held by Squads v4 multisig, 3 of 4 voters, time lock 0 sTo improve: limit admin keysA key stored in a protocol's own accounts that can change parameters, pause the protocol or move funds, without upgrading its code. to parameters behind a 24 h+ time lock, or renounce them → LOW
Code transparency
Mediumsource public at pump-fun, but the deployed build is not verified
To improve: verify the deployed build against public source (OtterSec) → LOW
Technical evidence (1 account)
- pAMM…fXEA verified_build Solana slot 460,978,360
Oracle dependency
Not applicablethe registry lists no price feeds; the evidence is the core programs' upgrade reads
To improve: not applicable: nothing to improve
Dependencies
Mediumcallee 6EF8…wF6P is Squads v4 multisig, 3 of 4 voters, time lock 0 s; callee pfee…ojVZ is Squads v4 multisig, 3 of 4 voters, time lock 0 s
To improve: callees rated Medium need a multisig of 5+ voters at a 60%+ threshold, or to be immutable → LOW
Technical evidence (5 accounts)
- pAMM…fXEA transaction sample (46 transactions) Solana slot 460,978,634
- B5Mv…2BQu upgrade_authority Solana slot 460,978,680
- 2yMo…rshW threshold, time_lock, members, config_authority Solana slot 460,978,361
- 75Uu…QLRw upgrade_authority Solana slot 460,978,680
- 2yMo…rshW threshold, time_lock, members, config_authority Solana slot 460,978,361
Stage
Stage 0 · 2 missing for Stage 1
StagesA protocol's headline level, from Stage 0 (the team can change everything quickly) to Stage 2 (users are protected even from the team). Stages describe control, not code security. describe who can change the protocol and how fast. They don't measure code security.
- Stage 0 (current)
- Stage 1
- Stage 2
Stage 0 3 of 3 met
- Met: core programs identified in the registry
- Met: public source for every core program
- Met: upgrade control readable for every core program
Stage 1 4 of 6 met
- Met: upgrade control rated Low or Medium
Satisfied criterion and evidence
MEDIUM: Squads v4 multisig, 3 of 4 voters, time lock 0 s
Published Stage criteria - Missing: upgrade delay of the Stage 1 minimum, unless upgrades need an emergency multisig
Unmet criterion
pAMM…fXEA: effective time lock 0 s; needs 5 days+ or an emergency multisig of 8+ voters at 75%+
Published Stage criteria - Met: admin powers rated Low or Medium
Satisfied criterion and evidence
MEDIUM:
Published Stage criteriaadmincan pause, held by Squads v4 multisig, 3 of 4 voters, time lock 0 s - Met: no multisig has a single-key config authorityA key that can change a Squads multisig's members, threshold and time lock without a vote. If it is set, it, not the multisig, is the real controller.
- Missing: verified buildsProof that the deployed program was built from a public commit, checked by OtterSec's verification service. for all core programs
- Met: every factor could be read (Unknown caps the Stage at 0)
Stage 2 0 of 2 met
- Missing: core programs immutable, or upgradeable only through on-chain governance with a long delay
- Missing: no key can move or freeze user funds
Control graph
Click a box for its facts and evidenceThe on-chain account, field and slot a fact was read from, with a link to check it on Solscan.. Arrows point from who holds a power to what it controls. Controllers shared across protocols
Loading the interactive graph…
List view
- Key Single key 7dGb…Crar High
- can freeze · no delay → USDC
- Key Single key BJE5…5ruG High
- can mint · no delay → USDC
- Multisig Squads 3 of 4 · no delay 2yMo…rshW Medium
- can upgrade · no delay → PumpSwap AMM
- Multisig Squads 3 of 4 · no delay 8Euj…A5at Medium
- can pause · no delay → admin
- Program PumpSwap AMM pAMM…fXEA Medium
- core program → PumpSwap
- ← Squads 3 of 4 · no delay can upgrade · no delay
- Admin account admin ADyA…JKqw Medium
- admin account → PumpSwap
- ← Squads 3 of 4 · no delay can pause · no delay
- Token USDC EPjF…Dt1v High
- used as liquidity → PumpSwap
- ← Single key can freeze · no delay
- ← Single key can mint · no delay
- Token SOL So11…1112 Low
- used as liquidity → PumpSwap
- Protocol PumpSwap Stage 0.
- ← PumpSwap AMM core program
- ← admin admin account
- ← USDC used as liquidity
- ← SOL used as liquidity
Permissions
Single key 7dGb…Crar
Show in control graph| Power | Over | Delay | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Freeze tokens | USDC (Circle) | no delay |
|
Single key BJE5…5ruG
Show in control graph| Power | Over | Delay | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mint tokens | USDC (Circle) | no delay |
|
Squads 3 of 4 · no delay 2yMo…rshW
Show in control graph| Power | Over | Delay | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Upgrade the code | PumpSwap AMM | no delay |
Squads 3 of 4 · no delay 8Euj…A5at
Show in control graph| Power | Over | Delay | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pause | admin on ADyA…JKqw | no delay |
Held by no one
- Freeze tokens: SOL (Solana (native mint)) (renounced or immutable)
- Mint tokens: SOL (Solana (native mint)) (renounced or immutable)
Programs
| Program | Role | Loader | Upgrade controller | Verification | Last upgrade |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PumpSwap AMM pAMM…fXEA | Core | Upgradeable loader | Squads 3 of 4 · no delay | Public source, not verified (source) | None found yet |
Upgrades & governance
- Upgrades
- 0
- Last upgrade
- None
- Average interval
- Not enough upgrades
- Last 30 days
- 0
History is still filling: 413 of 600 transactions examined so far.
No upgrades were found in the transactions examined so far.
Updates
No changes have been recorded for this protocol since tracking began.
Dependencies and sources
Called programs
Registry sources
- admin admin ADyA…JKqw source
- multisig Squads v4 2yMo…rshW source
- multisig Squads v4 8Euj…A5at source
- program PumpSwap AMM pAMM…fXEA source
Registry entry last reviewed 2026-10-19 by celebtir-loop-draft. Report an error · Markdown version