Highbalances can be frozen by single key 7dGb…Crar; new supply can be minted by single key BJE5…5ruG
Activity
VolumeDaily volume in US dollars, from DefiLlama.Show as table
Volume
Date
Volume
2026-09-25
$296.81M
2026-09-26
$198.97M
2026-09-27
$183.98M
2026-09-28
$272.14M
2026-09-29
$294.62M
2026-09-30
$309.85M
2026-10-01
$276.04M
2026-10-02
$267.94M
2026-10-03
$136.77M
2026-10-04
$149.59M
2026-10-05
$175.83M
2026-10-06
$184.69M
2026-10-07
$231.3M
2026-10-08
$233.18M
2026-10-09
$152.05M
2026-10-10
$106.11M
2026-10-11
$128.65M
2026-10-12
$169.58M
2026-10-13
$178.09M
2026-10-14
$168.85M
2026-10-15
$241.67M
2026-10-16
$194.71M
2026-10-17
$99.6M
2026-10-18
$103.74M
2026-10-19
$166.44M
2026-10-20
$210.53M
2026-10-21
$193.68M
2026-10-22
$154.23M
2026-10-23
$142.11M
2026-10-24
$135.67M
FeesDaily fees in US dollars, from DefiLlama.Show as table
Fees
Date
Fees
2026-09-25
$1.12M
2026-09-26
$640.83K
2026-09-27
$457.12K
2026-09-28
$835.47K
2026-09-29
$922K
2026-09-30
$791.39K
2026-10-01
$716.12K
2026-10-02
$751.5K
2026-10-03
$320.61K
2026-10-04
$396.87K
2026-10-05
$455.6K
2026-10-06
$461.41K
2026-10-07
$543.45K
2026-10-08
$504.35K
2026-10-09
$300.3K
2026-10-10
$222.77K
2026-10-11
$294.47K
2026-10-12
$424.67K
2026-10-13
$408.63K
2026-10-14
$319.89K
2026-10-15
$497.46K
2026-10-16
$451.23K
2026-10-17
$217.28K
2026-10-18
$197.97K
2026-10-19
$407.55K
2026-10-20
$471.29K
2026-10-21
$362.52K
2026-10-22
$290.65K
2026-10-23
$245.96K
2026-10-24
$213.79K
Risk summary
HighAn approved upgrade takes effect immediately. Withdrawal completion within that period is not established by these configuration facts.
HighProtocol parameters can be changed by the holder of key proj…k416 using owner.
MediumCore program code can be replaced by 3 of 4 votersA multisig member with the Vote permission. Celebtir counts signers, not all members, when it compares a threshold. of multisigAn account that acts only when enough of its members approve. On Solana this is usually a Squads multisig.tr8r…Hb4u.
MediumThe deployed code of 675k…1Mp8 has not been verified against its public source.
MediumThe deployed code of CAMM…rWqK has not been verified against its public source.
MediumThe deployed code of CPMM…KP1C has not been verified against its public source.
3 programs: SquadsThe multisig program most Solana protocols use to hold upgrade and admin keys (version 4 is supported). v4 multisig, 3 of 4 voters, time lockA wait between approving a change and the change taking effect, which gives users time to leave. 0 s
To improve: a multisig of 5+ voters at a 60%+ thresholdHow many signers of a multisig must approve before it can act. → LOW, or make the program immutableNo key can change it: the upgrade authority was removed, or the program was deployed with a loader that cannot upgrade.
owner can change parameters, held by single key proj…k416
To improve: hold every admin keyA key stored in a protocol's own accounts that can change parameters, pause the protocol or move funds, without upgrading its code. in a multisig of 3+ voters at a 50%+ threshold → MEDIUM
StagesA protocol's headline level, from Stage 0 (the team can change everything quickly) to Stage 2 (users are protected even from the team). Stages describe control, not code security. describe who can change the protocol and how fast. They don't measure code security.
Stage 0 (current)
Stage 1
Stage 2
Stage 0 3 of 3 met
✓Met: core programs identified in the registrySatisfied criterion and evidence
✗Missing: upgrade delay of the Stage 1 minimum, unless upgrades need an emergency multisigUnmet criterion
675k…1Mp8: effective time lock 0 s; CAMM…rWqK: effective time lock 0 s; CPMM…KP1C: effective time lock 0 s; needs 5 days+ or an emergency multisig of 8+ voters at 75%+
✓Met: no multisig has a single-key config authorityA key that can change a Squads multisig's members, threshold and time lock without a vote. If it is set, it, not the multisig, is the real controller.Satisfied criterion and evidence
✗Missing:verified buildsProof that the deployed program was built from a public commit, checked by OtterSec's verification service. for all core programsUnmet criterion
Click a box for its facts and evidenceThe on-chain account, field and slot a fact was read from, with a link to check it on Solscan.. Arrows point from who holds a power to what it controls. Controllers shared across protocols