Highaccepts BNSOL as collateral, which is rated High (Supply control: new supply can be minted by unrecognized controller 75NP…qjCV owned by program 1111…1111)
Highaccepts bSOL as collateral, which is rated High (Supply control: new supply can be minted by unrecognized controller 6Wec…CbV2 owned by program 1111…1111)
Highaccepts cbBTC as collateral, which is rated High (Supply control: new supply can be minted by single key CTQE…wy3p; Freeze and seize powers: balances can be frozen by single key DSFA…AVnz)
Highaccepts hSOL as collateral, which is rated High (Supply control: new supply can be minted by unrecognized controller 2rMu…j2YF owned by program 1111…1111)
Highaccepts JitoSOL as collateral, which is rated High (Supply control: new supply can be minted by unrecognized controller 6iQK…pVSS owned by program 1111…1111)
Activity
Volume unavailable: no volume metric for this category; fees only.
FeesDaily fees in US dollars, from DefiLlama.Show as table
Fees
Date
Fees
2026-09-24
$163.07K
2026-09-25
$164.64K
2026-09-26
$158.31K
2026-09-27
$157.22K
2026-09-28
$159.06K
2026-09-29
$208.26K
2026-09-30
$228.8K
2026-10-01
$165.73K
2026-10-02
$166.64K
2026-10-03
$171.59K
2026-10-04
$172.22K
2026-10-05
$159.04K
2026-10-06
$159.04K
2026-10-07
$150.16K
2026-10-08
$149.49K
2026-10-09
$148.14K
2026-10-10
$152.07K
2026-10-11
$151.01K
2026-10-12
$148.79K
2026-10-13
$155.41K
2026-10-14
$148.12K
2026-10-15
$148.14K
2026-10-16
$149.75K
2026-10-17
$143.14K
2026-10-18
$140.1K
2026-10-19
$144.84K
2026-10-20
$140.85K
2026-10-21
$140.98K
2026-10-22
$138.66K
2026-10-23
$143.72K
Risk summary
HighProtocol parameters can be changed by 4 of 10 votersA multisig member with the Vote permission. Celebtir counts signers, not all members, when it compares a threshold. of multisigAn account that acts only when enough of its members approve. On Solana this is usually a Squads multisig.7idE…Et6H using lending_market_owner.
HighPrices can be manipulated if a protocol-run feed reports a false price for SOL reserve.
MediumCore program code can be replaced by 5 of 10 voters of multisig 6hhB…fQbM.
MediumAn approved upgrade takes effect after 24 h. Withdrawal completion within that period is not established by these configuration facts.
SquadsThe multisig program most Solana protocols use to hold upgrade and admin keys (version 4 is supported). v4 multisig, 5 of 10 voters, time lockA wait between approving a change and the change taking effect, which gives users time to leave. 24 h
To improve: a multisig of 5+ voters at a 60%+ thresholdHow many signers of a multisig must approve before it can act. → LOW, or make the program immutableNo key can change it: the upgrade authority was removed, or the program was deployed with a loader that cannot upgrade.
lending_market_owner can change parameters, held by Squads v4 multisig, 4 of 10 voters, time lock 12 h
To improve: hold every admin keyA key stored in a protocol's own accounts that can change parameters, pause the protocol or move funds, without upgrading its code. in a multisig of 3+ voters at a 50%+ threshold → MEDIUM
verified buildProof that the deployed program was built from a public commit, checked by OtterSec's verification service. of Kamino-Finance/klend@e921c64 at e921c648765fc2343c87614a00f4b39b640f0510
To improve: take prices from an established oracleAn account that publishes prices a protocol reads, for example to value collateral or trigger liquidations. network (pyth, switchboard, chainlink) → MEDIUM
StagesA protocol's headline level, from Stage 0 (the team can change everything quickly) to Stage 2 (users are protected even from the team). Stages describe control, not code security. describe who can change the protocol and how fast. They don't measure code security.
Stage 0 (current)
Stage 1
Stage 2
Stage 0 3 of 3 met
✓Met: core programs identified in the registrySatisfied criterion and evidence
✓Met: no multisig has a single-key config authorityA key that can change a Squads multisig's members, threshold and time lock without a vote. If it is set, it, not the multisig, is the real controller.Satisfied criterion and evidence
Click a box for its facts and evidenceThe on-chain account, field and slot a fact was read from, with a link to check it on Solscan.. Arrows point from who holds a power to what it controls. Controllers shared across protocols
